
Behavioral Economics — Present Bias and Time Inconsistency
Behavioral Economics — Today’s Self and Tomorrow’s Self Make Different Plans
Discounting the future is not in itself irrational. The problem is how we discount. With the exponential discounting of the standard model, the plan made today is one we still want to follow tomorrow. Real people plan patiently for the distant future and then reverse their plans when that future becomes “now.”
1. Exponential discounting is time-consistent
2. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and preference reversals
Laibson’s β-δ model adds an extra discount between “now” and “later.”
Ask someone with and (no long-run discounting, for simplicity) the following, in units of 10,000 won.
- Asked on 1 January: “100,000 won on 1 March” vs “110,000 won on 2 March” → both are in the future, so both are discounted by : vs . The person picks 110,000 won.
- Asked again on 1 March: “100,000 won today” vs “110,000 won tomorrow” → today’s amount is not discounted: vs . The person picks 100,000 won.
The same person reversed their preference over the same two options just because the timing changed. This is time inconsistency. It is the structure behind the repeated “starting tomorrow” in dieting, exercise, saving and work with deadlines.
β-δ discounting falls steeply only between period 0 and period 1; after that it declines at the same rate as exponential discounting.
3. Naivety and sophistication
Behaviour differs depending on whether a present-biased person knows that their future self will also be present-biased.
| Type | Belief about future self | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Naive | Tomorrow's self will follow the plan | Keeps procrastinating; does not buy commitment devices |
| Sophisticated | Tomorrow's self will also procrastinate | Buys commitment devices; sometimes acts early |
O’Donoghue and Rabin’s example: you must see one of four films, each better than the last, but can see only one. A naive person may keep saying “I’ll see a better one next week” and miss them all. A sophisticated person, knowing their future self will procrastinate, actually decides early.
4. Gym memberships: evidence from the field
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) showed with US gym membership data that monthly members, dividing their fees by actual visits, paid about 17 dollars per visit. A 10-visit pass (10 dollars a visit) would have been cheaper. When choosing the monthly plan they expected to go often but went less. This is evidence consistent with naive present bias, which overestimates future self-control.
5. Commitment devices and saving design
Sophisticated people pay for commitment devices that restrict their own future choices: savings products with withdrawal restrictions, contracts that forfeit money if a goal is missed, Christmas savings clubs. In the standard model there is no reason to pay for a contract that removes options, so demand for commitment devices is itself evidence of present bias.
Thaler and Benartzi’s Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) programme used present bias and loss aversion together. Employees committed in advance to raising their saving rate not now, but from their next pay rise.
- Because the increase is in the future, present bias bites less (no sacrifice now).
- Because it comes out of the pay rise, take-home pay does not fall, so it does not feel like a loss.
- Participants could leave at any time, but because of status quo bias (Chapter 3), most stayed.
At the first firm to adopt it, participants’ average saving rate rose from 3.5% to 13.6% over about 40 months.
Check your understanding
A person with and faces a choice with a cost of 6 today (the pain of exercise) and a benefit of 7 tomorrow (health). Deciding today? , so the person does not exercise. Had they made the plan yesterday, , so they would have planned “I’ll exercise tomorrow.” They make plans but postpone carrying them out.
References
- David Laibson, “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997)
- Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, “Doing It Now or Later,” American Economic Review (1999)
- Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier, “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” American Economic Review (2006)
- Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi, “Save More Tomorrow,” Journal of Political Economy (2004)
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