Economics•Chapter 5•5 min read•Updated September 24, 2026

Behavioral Economics — Judgement Heuristics and Biased Beliefs

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Behavioral Economics — Judging by Resemblance and Ease of Recall Instead of Calculating Probabilities

Chapters 2–4 dealt with how preferences differ from the standard model. This chapter deals with beliefs. The standard model assumes that people incorporate new information exactly according to Bayes’ rule. Tversky and Kahneman showed that people rely on a few heuristics instead of complex probability calculations, and that these heuristics go wrong in predictable directions.

1. Representativeness and base-rate neglect

A disease has a prevalence of 1%. A test detects 90% of patients as positive, and also wrongly flags 9% of healthy people as positive. What is the probability that someone who tests positive actually has the disease?

Bayes' rule
P(D∣+)=P(+∣D)P(D)P(+∣D)P(D)+P(+∣¬D)P(¬D)=0.9×0.010.9×0.01+0.09×0.99≈9.2%P(D\mid +) = \frac{P(+\mid D)P(D)}{P(+\mid D)P(D)+P(+\mid \neg D)P(\neg D)} = \frac{0.9\times 0.01}{0.9\times 0.01 + 0.09\times 0.99}\approx 9.2\%
Of 10,000 people, the 100 patients produce 90 positives and the 9,900 healthy people produce 891 positives. Of the 981 positives, only 90 are patients.

Many people (including medical professionals) give an answer close to 90%. They look only at “how much a positive result resembles a patient” (the accuracy of the test) and neglect the base rate (the 1% prevalence). This way of judging is called the representativeness heuristic.

Representativeness produces other errors too.

  • The conjunction fallacy: after hearing that “Linda majored in philosophy and was deeply concerned with social justice,” 85% of respondents judged “Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement” more likely than “Linda is a bank teller.” The probability of two events together cannot exceed the probability of either one.
  • The gambler’s fallacy: after five heads in a row, tails seems due. It is the belief that even small samples must resemble the population (the law of small numbers).
  • Belief in the hot hand: conversely, streaks of success are over-read as evidence of skill. Later research that corrected the statistical method found a weak real hot-hand effect in basketball, however, so not every belief in streaks is an error.

2. Availability

Judging how frequent an event is by how easily examples come to mind is the availability heuristic. The risks of vivid, heavily reported events such as plane crashes and shark attacks are overestimated, and common but undramatic risks such as diabetes and falls are underestimated.

The economic consequences appear in insurance and investment. Purchases of flood insurance rise right after a flood and cancellations rise a few years later, and money floods into assets that have recently surged — patterns consistent with availability.

3. Anchoring and adjustment

People start from an initially presented number (the anchor) and adjust, but not enough. In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) experiment, participants saw the result of a wheel spun in front of them (10 or 65) and then estimated the percentage of UN member states that are African. The median estimate was 25% in the group that saw 10 and 45% in the group that saw 65. An irrelevant number pulled the estimates.

Economically, first offers in negotiations, “list prices” in retail and previous salaries in pay negotiations act as anchors. That is one reason showing the pre-discount price boosts sales.

4. Overconfidence

Three forms of overconfidence
FormDescriptionEconomic consequence
OverestimationRating one's own ability or performance higher than it isExcessive business entry, excessive trading
OverplacementBelieving oneself better than averageMost respondents in driving surveys rate themselves 'above average'
OverprecisionUnderestimating the uncertainty of one's own forecasts90% confidence intervals miss far more often than they should

Overprecision can be measured with calibration tests. When people give “ranges I am 90% sure of” across many questions, a well-calibrated person should get 9 out of 10 right. In studies such as those of corporate finance officers’ forecasts of stock returns, actual hit rates come out far lower. Chapter 8 looks at evidence that overconfidence leads to excessive trading.

5. Confirmation bias

People seek out and give heavy weight to information that supports beliefs they already hold, and seek less and discount information against them. The result is attitude polarization: two people who see the same evidence each hold their original beliefs more strongly. Under Bayesian updating, the same evidence should move both people’s beliefs in the same direction.

Check your understanding

In a city, 85% of taxis are green and 15% blue. A witness to an accident testified that the taxi was blue, and the witness distinguishes colours correctly 80% of the time. What is the probability the taxi really was blue? 0.8×0.150.8×0.15+0.2×0.85=0.120.29≈41%\frac{0.8\times 0.15}{0.8\times 0.15+0.2\times 0.85}=\frac{0.12}{0.29}\approx 41\%. Looking only at the witness’s 80% accuracy overestimates it; once the 15% base rate is included, it is still more likely that the taxi was green.

References

  • Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science (1974)
  • Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment,” Psychological Review (1983)
  • Don Moore and Paul Healy, “The Trouble with Overconfidence,” Psychological Review (2008)
  • Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage, “How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction: Frequency Formats,” Psychological Review (1995)
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