Introduction to Economics — Market Structure: Perfect Competition, Monopoly and Oligopoly
Introduction to Economics — Market Structure Is the Relationship Between Price and Marginal Cost, Not the Number of Firms
Memorizing the number of firms and entry barriers from a table is classification. What an intermediate review needs to state is whether equals , and whether long-run profit disappears through entry.
1. Long-run equilibrium under perfect competition is P = MC = min ATC
In the short run, as in Chapter 4, firms produce where and may earn profits. With free entry, profits attract more supply and drive price down to . Zero economic profit is not zero accounting profit: the opportunity cost of capital is already in ATC.
With demand and long-run industry supply at (constant cost), the competitive quantity is 80 and the price 40 won. In every transaction , so there is no deadweight loss.
2. A monopolist chooses quantity where MR = MC and reads price off demand
With linear demand , total revenue is and . With , gives and = 80 won. Compared with competition, quantity is halved and price doubled.
= 800 won is the deadweight loss in this example. Consumer surplus transferred to the firm is not deadweight loss. Interview questions become tractable once you separate who gets the surplus from what disappears.
| Structure | Quantity rule | Long-run profit |
|---|---|---|
| Perfect competition | P = MC | Zero through entry |
| Single-price monopoly | MR = MC, P > MC | Possible if there are barriers |
| Monopolistic competition | MR = MC, long-run P = ATC > MC | Zero, but with excess capacity |
| Oligopoly | Depends on rivals' strategies | Positive under collusion, near zero in a price war |
Price discrimination raises profit when consumer types have different elasticities. Perfect (first-degree) discrimination can reduce deadweight loss but requires information and the prevention of resale. The proposition “discrimination is always bad for consumers” is close to true only in some markets with third-degree discrimination.
3. Oligopoly combines the incentive to collude and the incentive to cheat
If two firms split the monopoly profit of 800 won, each gets 400 won. If one cuts its price slightly and takes the market, it gets 700 won and the other 50 won. The Nash equilibrium is to cheat. If the game is repeated for long enough and deviations can be punished, collusion can be an equilibrium. One-off tenders are not like that.
Regulating price at is efficient but causes losses for a natural monopoly. Regulating it at removes the losses but leaves a deadweight loss. When asked about public enterprises or utility regulation, state this trade-off first.
Check your understanding
Demand is and . What are the competitive and monopoly quantities? Competitive . For the monopolist, gives and = 60 won. The DWL is = 800 won.
References
- Hal Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics, ch. 24–27
- Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, ch. 1
- MIT OpenCourseWare, 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics
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