Introduction to Economics — Market Failure and Government Intervention: Externalities, Public Goods and Asymmetric Information
Introduction to Economics — Market Failure Is Not the Absence of Trade but the Wrong Price
The deadweight loss of Chapter 5 was caused by monopoly power. This chapter covers cases in which diverges from the social margin even without market power. Government intervention does not automatically bring efficiency; intervention has its own information and incentive costs.
1. An externality is a margin left out of the decision-maker’s calculation
If a factory’s private marginal cost is and the damage is 6 per unit, the social marginal cost is . With demand , the market quantity solves : , = 25 won. The social optimum solves : , = 28 won. There are 3 units of overproduction.
The Coase theorem states that if property rights are clear and bargaining is costless, the efficient quantity is reached whoever holds the rights. When there are many parties and the damage is irreversible, bargaining costs are the premise. “Because of Coase, regulation is unnecessary” is not an assumption of the theorem; it is ideology.
2. Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable, so price cannot ration quantity
When one person’s consumption does not reduce another’s (non-rival) and it is hard to exclude those who do not pay (non-excludable), as with national defence, free riding is a dominant strategy. For private goods, demands are added horizontally; the social demand for a public good adds willingness to pay vertically. Left to the market, it is undersupplied.
Common resources are non-excludable but rival. As with overgrazing on common pasture, average output is shared while marginal damage is passed on to others. The solutions are exclusion (property rights), quotas and community rules — not a one-line “it’s a public good, so nationalize it.”
| Excludable | Hard to exclude | |
|---|---|---|
| Rival | Private goods (bread) | Common resources (fisheries) |
| Non-rival | Club goods (toll roads, before congestion) | Pure public goods (national defence) |
3. Asymmetric information lets the average price drive out good products
In a used-car market where a good car is worth 15 million won and a bad one 8 million won, a buyer who cannot tell the types apart offers an expected value somewhere between. Owners of good cars do not sell, and what remains are bad cars. This is adverse selection. Moral hazard arises when behaviour after the contract cannot be observed: insurance reduces preventive effort.
Signalling (warranties, qualifications, capital) and screening (deductibles, collateral) are contracts that try to put information back into prices. A signal works only if its cost differs by type; a signal everyone can send cheaply carries no information.
Emissions trading is close to the mirror image of a Pigouvian tax: quantity is fixed and price adjusts. Weitzman’s distinction — quantity regulation is better when uncertainty lies on the damage side, a tax when it lies on the cost side — guides the practical choice.
Check your understanding
If unit damage were not 6 won but proportional to output, , the optimal Pigouvian tax would not be a constant. It must be set to at the optimal quantity. A fixed rate of 6 won is the wrong tool for this marginal damage function.
References
- Hal Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics, ch. 34–37
- Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics (1960)
- George Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970)
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