
Microeconomics — Market Failure: Externalities, Public Goods and Information
Microeconomics — Market Failure Is Not the Absence of Trade but a Wrong Price
The competitive equilibrium of Chapter 6 was efficient because prices captured both social marginal benefit and social marginal cost. This chapter looks at three ways that condition breaks down: costs missing from prices (externalities), goods that cannot be priced (public goods), and trades in which the price cannot convey quality (asymmetric information). It turns the definitions of Introduction to Economics, Chapter 6 into calculations, and the policy design continues in Public Finance, Chapter 1.
1. Externalities: the gap between private and social cost
Suppose a firm’s private marginal cost is , each unit of output causes 8 won of damage to neighbours, and demand is . Social marginal cost is .
- Market equilibrium: → , won
- Social optimum: → , won
The market overproduces by 4 units. The part of those 4 units in which social cost exceeds benefit is a deadweight loss of won.
The shaded triangle is the deadweight loss of 16 won. A tax of 8 won per unit raises private cost to social cost.
The Coase theorem says that if property rights are clear and bargaining is costless, the parties will reach the efficient quantity through negotiation whoever holds the right. This can work with one neighbour, but when there are thousands of victims and the damage is irreversible, bargaining is impossible.
Tax or quantity control? A tax fixes the price and lets quantity adjust; tradable permits fix the quantity and let the price adjust. When the government does not know abatement costs precisely, Weitzman offered a criterion: if damage rises sharply beyond some quantity (a steep marginal damage curve), fixing the quantity is safer; if abatement costs rise sharply (a steep marginal abatement cost curve), fixing the price makes estimation errors less costly.
2. Public goods and common resources
Classifying goods along two dimensions shows where markets supply well and where they do not.
| Excludable | Non-excludable | |
|---|---|---|
| Rival | Private goods (well supplied by markets) | Common resources (overused) |
| Non-rival | Club goods (pay TV, uncongested toll roads) | Pure public goods (undersupplied) |
Because a pure public good can be used without paying, each person’s best strategy is to wait for others to pay — free riding. The efficiency condition is the Samuelson condition, in which individuals’ marginal benefits summed vertically equal marginal cost; a numerical example is in Public Finance, Chapter 1.
Common resources pose the opposite problem. Fish caught by one person reduce what others can catch, but no one takes that cost into account, so fisheries are overfished (the tragedy of the commons). Catch quotas, user fees and property rights are remedies, and Ostrom also documented communities that managed common resources for long periods through their own rules.
3. Asymmetric information: the market for lemons
In a used-car market, half the cars are good (worth 13 million won to sellers and 15 million won to buyers) and half are bad (worth 6 million won to sellers and 8 million won to buyers). With symmetric information every car is traded. If buyers cannot tell cars apart, they will pay no more than the expected value, million won.
At that price, owners of good cars will not sell for less than 13 million won and leave the market. If buyers know that only bad cars remain, the price falls to 8 million won. The sale of good cars, which would have benefited everyone, has disappeared. This is adverse selection.
| Adverse selection | Moral hazard | |
|---|---|---|
| What is hidden | Type before the contract (quality, risk) | Action after the contract (effort, care) |
| Examples | Used cars, insurance applicants' health | Carelessness after insuring, agents shirking |
| Responses | Warranties, inspections, signals, compulsory insurance | Deductibles and co-payments, performance pay, monitoring |
The informed side can also reveal quality itself. Sellers of good cars offer warranties, and able job seekers earn costly degrees. In Spence’s signalling model, a degree can separate high-ability from low-ability workers even if it does not raise productivity, as long as it is cheaper for high-ability people to obtain.
Check your understanding
With private marginal cost , marginal damage of 8 won per unit and demand , how much does the market overproduce and what is the Pigouvian tax? Market output is 20 and optimal output 16, so there are 4 units of overproduction and the tax is 8 won. If marginal damage were , rising with output, social marginal cost would be , gives , and the tax would be the marginal damage at that point, won. Here too the tax equals marginal damage measured at the optimal quantity.
References
- Hal Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics, ch. 35–38
- Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics (1960)
- George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970)
- Martin Weitzman, “Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies (1974)
Oiyo
Editorial DeskThe OIYO editorial desk researches money, law, lifestyle, and self-understanding topics against primary sources and public statistics. Every piece carries source notes and is reviewed on a regular cycle for accuracy and usefulness.