
Microeconomics — Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
Microeconomics — In Oligopoly, Rivals’ Strategies Are Part of Your Demand
With only a few firms, no firm can take the price as given like a competitive firm, nor use the whole market demand alone like a monopolist. Each firm’s best choice depends on the others’ choices. This chapter keeps the same market demand, , and a marginal cost of zero, and compares how outcomes change with the strategic variable firms use. The general theory of mixed strategies and repeated games is in Chapter 11.
1. Cournot: choosing quantities simultaneously
Two firms choose outputs and at the same time and the market sets the price . Firm 1’s profit is . Maximising it while taking the rival’s output as given:
This is firm 1’s reaction function: the more the rival produces, the less I produce. Solving it together with firm 2’s symmetric reaction function gives , market output 80 and a price of 40 won. Each firm is best-responding to the other, so this point is a Nash equilibrium.
The Cournot equilibrium is where the two reaction functions cross. The cartel point is better for both firms but lies on neither reaction function.
2. Stackelberg: moving first pays
If firm 1 sets its output first and firm 2 responds after observing it, firm 1 substitutes firm 2’s reaction function into its own profit:
Maximising gives , and a price of 30 won. The leader earns 1,800 won, more than the Cournot 1,600, and the follower’s profit falls to 900. Committing to a large output first makes the rival produce less. This is why hard-to-reverse choices such as capacity investment have strategic value.
3. Bertrand: competing on price
If two firms selling an identical product compete on price, undercutting the rival by just 1 won captures the whole market. As long as the price is above marginal cost, each has an incentive to shave it a little, so the equilibrium is . That two firms produce the competitive outcome is the Bertrand paradox.
The paradox is resolved under three conditions: capacity limits mean the cheaper firm cannot serve the whole market; product differentiation means a slightly higher price does not lose every customer; and in repeated interaction a price cut can be punished.
4. Collusion and the incentive to cheat
If the two firms agree to act like a monopolist, market output is 60, the price is 60 won and each produces 30 for a profit of 1,800 won — more than the Cournot 1,600. But if the rival produces 30, my best response is . The price falls to 45 won, yet I earn 2,025 won and the rival’s profit drops to 1,350. In a one-shot game, the cartel does not hold.
Repetition changes this. Under a trigger strategy that reverts to Cournot forever after any deviation, the value of keeping the agreement is and the value of cheating is .
This is why competition authorities use leniency programmes, which reduce fines for the first firm to confess: they raise the payoff to defecting from within the cartel.
| Model | Market output | Price | Profit per firm |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monopoly / cartel | 60 | 60 won | 1,800 (split between 2 firms) |
| Stackelberg | 90 | 30 won | 1,800 / 900 |
| Cournot | 80 | 40 won | 1,600 / 1,600 |
| Bertrand | 120 | 0 won | 0 / 0 |
5. Monopolistic competition
Markets with many firms and free entry but slightly different products (restaurants, hair salons, clothing) are called monopolistic competition. Because of differentiation, each firm has its own downward-sloping demand curve and produces where . If firms make profits in the short run, similar products enter and reduce each firm’s demand. In the long run profit is zero where the demand curve is tangent to the average cost curve.
As a result, even in the long run. The price is above marginal cost and firms produce less than the output that minimises average cost, leaving excess capacity. Whether this is simply inefficient depends on how much people value variety; if they want many choices, slightly higher average cost may be a price worth paying.
Check your understanding
What is the Cournot equilibrium with demand and two firms with marginal cost 10 won? From the formula , market output 60, price 40 won and profit won per firm. Under collusion, market output is 45 (the monopoly level), the price 55 won and each firm makes 22.5 units for a profit of 1,012.5 won, which is better for both; but the best response to a rival producing 22.5 is , so collusion does not hold in a one-shot game.
References
- Hal Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics, ch. 27–28
- Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, ch. 5–6
- MIT OpenCourseWare, 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics
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