Macroeconomics — Business Cycles: Demand Shocks and Supply Shocks
Macroeconomics — A Recession Has One Name, but Shocks Come from Two Directions
The fact that output has fallen below potential does not by itself tell us what to do. Depending on whether aggregate demand or aggregate supply has fallen, prices move in opposite directions and the right policy differs. This chapter uses the AD-AS model of Chapter 8 as a diagnostic tool for business cycles.
1. Stylized facts of business cycles
| Fact | Description |
|---|---|
| Comovement | Output, employment, consumption, investment and corporate profits move together |
| Volatile investment | Investment fluctuates several times more than output; consumption is smoother than output |
| Countercyclical unemployment | Unemployment rises when output falls (Okun's law) |
| Irregularity | Expansions and contractions vary in length and depth, so they are closer to 'fluctuations' than 'cycles' |
Investment swings widely because of the accelerator principle and expectations from Chapter 6; consumption is smooth because of the consumption smoothing of Chapter 5.
2. Identifying shocks by their signs
When an oil price rise shifts SRAS up and to the left, output falls and prices rise. Because the economy moves along the aggregate demand curve, the two variables move in opposite directions.
| Cause | Examples | Prices | First response |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fall in aggregate demand | Credit crunch, collapse in exports, fiscal austerity | Fall | Monetary and fiscal expansion |
| Adverse supply shock | Oil price spike, supply-chain disruption, productivity slowdown | Rise | Easing supply bottlenecks, managing expectations |
A supply shock puts policymakers in a dilemma. Raising aggregate demand restores output but pushes prices up further, and if expected inflation rises, the Phillips curve of Chapter 9 shifts up and the cost grows. Cutting aggregate demand controls prices but deepens the recession. If the shock is temporary and expectations are anchored, “looking through” it is also an option. In the 1970s expectations followed inflation up, inflation became entrenched, and it could only be brought down at the cost of a deep recession.
3. What causes fluctuations: two views
Real business cycle (RBC) theory sees technology (productivity) shocks as the main source of fluctuations. Prices are flexible, and business cycles are the result of people responding optimally to changes in productivity. Since even recessions are efficient responses, there is little role for stabilization policy. The 1982 paper by Kydland and Prescott is the starting point.
New Keynesian economics explicitly models price and wage stickiness and imperfect competition. Aggregate demand shocks then move output, recessions are inefficient and monetary policy can raise welfare. The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models used by central banks today combine the RBC methodology (optimizing households and firms, rational expectations) with New Keynesian rigidities.
4. Propagation: how small shocks become large fluctuations
Recent research focuses less on the shocks themselves than on amplification and persistence.
- Financial accelerator: when asset prices fall, collateral values shrink, borrowing becomes harder, investment falls and asset prices fall further. This is the same structure as crisis amplification in Financial Economics Chapter 5.
- Labour market search: after jobs are destroyed it takes time to find new ones, so unemployment persists (Chapter 20).
- Hysteresis: when the long-term unemployed lose skills, cyclical unemployment turns into structural unemployment and potential output itself falls.
Check your understanding
In one year output falls by 2% and prices rise by 3%. Which shock dominated, and what happens if policy responds with demand expansion? Output and prices moved in opposite directions, so an adverse supply shock dominated. Raising aggregate demand to restore output would push prices up by more than 3%, and if expected inflation follows, a larger cost must be paid later. A single demand policy cannot return both variables to where they were.
References
- N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics, ch. 10, 14
- Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations,” Econometrica (1982)
- Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist, “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” Handbook of Macroeconomics (1999)
- MIT OpenCourseWare, 14.02 Principles of Macroeconomics
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