Economics•Chapter 13•5 min read•Updated September 24, 2026

Macroeconomics — The Trade-offs of Stabilization Policy

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13/23

Macroeconomics — Sometimes One Interest Rate Cannot Put Both Inflation and the Output Gap Where We Want Them

Chapter 10 distinguished shocks by their direction. With a demand shock, prices and output move in the same direction, so a single interest rate can correct both. With a supply shock they move in opposite directions, and fixing one worsens the other. This chapter writes that trade-off as an equation and looks at the principles central banks use to choose.

1. The number of targets and instruments

Tinbergen argued that nn independent policy targets require at least nn independent instruments. If a single policy rate is charged with price stability, full employment, exchange-rate stability and financial stability, some of them must be given up. That is why macroprudential policies such as lending limits are used for financial stability, and labour market policies for structural unemployment.

2. The loss function and supply shocks

Suppose the central bank dislikes both deviations of inflation from target and the output gap.

The central bank's loss function
L=(π−π∗)2+λ y2L = (\pi - \pi^*)^2 + \lambda\, y^2
π* is the inflation target, y the output gap (%) and λ the weight placed on output stability. With λ = 0 the central bank cares only about inflation.

Suppose expected inflation is anchored at the 2% target and the Phillips curve is π=2+κy+ε\pi=2+\kappa y+\varepsilon, where ε\varepsilon is a supply shock. The loss-minimizing output gap is y=−κ(π−2)/λy=-\kappa(\pi-2)/\lambda, and substituting it into the Phillips curve gives

π−2=ε1+κ2/λ\pi-2=\frac{\varepsilon}{1+\kappa^2/\lambda}

With a supply shock of ε=3\varepsilon=3 points and κ=0.5\kappa=0.5:

The same supply shock, different preferences
λInflationOutput gapInterpretation
0 (inflation only)2%−6%Returns prices to target at once and accepts a deep recession
0.253.5%−3%Absorbs the shock half and half
14.4%−1.2%Absorbs most of it in prices
→ ∞ (output only)5%0%Passes the whole shock through to prices

How the shock is shared is decided not by economics but by a value judgement, λ\lambda. The assumption that expectations are anchored matters, though. If inflation is left high for long and expectations rise, the Phillips curve shifts up (Chapter 9) and the trade-off worsens at every later date. That is why many central banks use flexible inflation targeting, which takes output stability into account while bringing inflation back to target over the medium term.

3. The Taylor rule

Taylor showed that the US Federal Reserve’s interest rate decisions were well described by a simple rule.

The Taylor rule
i=r∗+π+0.5 (π−π∗)+0.5 yi = r^* + \pi + 0.5\,(\pi - \pi^*) + 0.5\,y
r* is the neutral real interest rate. If inflation is 1 point above target, the nominal rate rises by 1.5 points, raising the real rate (the Taylor principle). A negative output gap lowers the rate.

With r∗=1%r^*=1\%, inflation of 4%, a target of 2% and an output gap of −1%, i=1+4+0.5×2+0.5×(−1)=5.5%i=1+4+0.5\times 2+0.5\times(-1)=5.5\%. The coefficient on inflation must exceed 1 (the nominal rate must rise by more than inflation) for the real rate to rise and restrain inflation.

4. Rules versus discretion, and time inconsistency

Rules and discretion
AdvantagesDisadvantages
RulesAnchor expectations and increase predictabilityRespond poorly to exceptional shocks
DiscretionRespond to circumstancesTime inconsistency, inflation bias

Kydland and Prescott pointed out time inconsistency. If a central bank promises today to keep inflation low and people come to expect low inflation, tomorrow it will be tempted to use surprise inflation to lower unemployment temporarily. If people know this, they do not believe the promise in the first place and expect high inflation. The result is unchanged unemployment and higher inflation (inflation bias). Central bank independence, appointing governors who put price stability first and announced inflation targets are devices that make promises credible.

5. Policy lags

Policy faces three lags: the recognition lag before a shock is noticed, the implementation lag for decisions and legislation, and the effect lag before policy affects the economy. Monetary policy is quick to implement but has a long effect lag (usually one to two years); fiscal policy may act faster but takes time to legislate. When lags are long and uncertain, policy may take effect after the economy has already turned and amplify fluctuations. This is the empirical basis for Friedman’s preference for simple rules over discretionary fine-tuning.

Check your understanding

Under a Taylor rule with r∗=1%r^*=1\% and an inflation target of 2%, what is the policy rate if inflation is 3% and the output gap is +2%? 1+3+0.5×1+0.5×2=5.5%1+3+0.5\times 1+0.5\times 2=5.5\%. If instead a supply shock has pushed inflation to 3% while the output gap is −2%, the rate is 1+3+0.5−1=3.5%1+3+0.5-1=3.5\%. The rule blends deviations from the two targets with weights and answers with a single rate.

References

  • John Taylor, “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series (1993)
  • Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, “Rules Rather than Discretion,” Journal of Political Economy (1977)
  • Bank of Korea, Monetary policy framework (Korean)
  • N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics, ch. 18
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