Macroeconomics — The Trade-offs of Stabilization Policy
Macroeconomics — Sometimes One Interest Rate Cannot Put Both Inflation and the Output Gap Where We Want Them
Chapter 10 distinguished shocks by their direction. With a demand shock, prices and output move in the same direction, so a single interest rate can correct both. With a supply shock they move in opposite directions, and fixing one worsens the other. This chapter writes that trade-off as an equation and looks at the principles central banks use to choose.
1. The number of targets and instruments
Tinbergen argued that independent policy targets require at least independent instruments. If a single policy rate is charged with price stability, full employment, exchange-rate stability and financial stability, some of them must be given up. That is why macroprudential policies such as lending limits are used for financial stability, and labour market policies for structural unemployment.
2. The loss function and supply shocks
Suppose the central bank dislikes both deviations of inflation from target and the output gap.
Suppose expected inflation is anchored at the 2% target and the Phillips curve is , where is a supply shock. The loss-minimizing output gap is , and substituting it into the Phillips curve gives
With a supply shock of points and :
| λ | Inflation | Output gap | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 (inflation only) | 2% | −6% | Returns prices to target at once and accepts a deep recession |
| 0.25 | 3.5% | −3% | Absorbs the shock half and half |
| 1 | 4.4% | −1.2% | Absorbs most of it in prices |
| → ∞ (output only) | 5% | 0% | Passes the whole shock through to prices |
How the shock is shared is decided not by economics but by a value judgement, . The assumption that expectations are anchored matters, though. If inflation is left high for long and expectations rise, the Phillips curve shifts up (Chapter 9) and the trade-off worsens at every later date. That is why many central banks use flexible inflation targeting, which takes output stability into account while bringing inflation back to target over the medium term.
3. The Taylor rule
Taylor showed that the US Federal Reserve’s interest rate decisions were well described by a simple rule.
With , inflation of 4%, a target of 2% and an output gap of −1%, . The coefficient on inflation must exceed 1 (the nominal rate must rise by more than inflation) for the real rate to rise and restrain inflation.
4. Rules versus discretion, and time inconsistency
| Advantages | Disadvantages | |
|---|---|---|
| Rules | Anchor expectations and increase predictability | Respond poorly to exceptional shocks |
| Discretion | Respond to circumstances | Time inconsistency, inflation bias |
Kydland and Prescott pointed out time inconsistency. If a central bank promises today to keep inflation low and people come to expect low inflation, tomorrow it will be tempted to use surprise inflation to lower unemployment temporarily. If people know this, they do not believe the promise in the first place and expect high inflation. The result is unchanged unemployment and higher inflation (inflation bias). Central bank independence, appointing governors who put price stability first and announced inflation targets are devices that make promises credible.
5. Policy lags
Policy faces three lags: the recognition lag before a shock is noticed, the implementation lag for decisions and legislation, and the effect lag before policy affects the economy. Monetary policy is quick to implement but has a long effect lag (usually one to two years); fiscal policy may act faster but takes time to legislate. When lags are long and uncertain, policy may take effect after the economy has already turned and amplify fluctuations. This is the empirical basis for Friedman’s preference for simple rules over discretionary fine-tuning.
Check your understanding
Under a Taylor rule with and an inflation target of 2%, what is the policy rate if inflation is 3% and the output gap is +2%? . If instead a supply shock has pushed inflation to 3% while the output gap is −2%, the rate is . The rule blends deviations from the two targets with weights and answers with a single rate.
References
- John Taylor, “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series (1993)
- Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, “Rules Rather than Discretion,” Journal of Political Economy (1977)
- Bank of Korea, Monetary policy framework (Korean)
- N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics, ch. 18
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